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Abstract. The Curiosity rover is one of the most complex systems suc-
cessfully deployed in a planetary exploration mission to date. It was sent
by NASA to explore the surface of Mars and to identify potential signs
of life. Even though it has limited autonomy on-board, most of its de-
cisions are made by the ground control team. This hinders the speed at
which the Curiosity reacts to its environment, due to the communica-
tion delays between Earth and Mars. Depending on the orbital position
of both planets, it can take 4–24 minutes for a message to be transmitted
between Earth and Mars. If the Curiosity were controlled autonomously,
it would be able to perform its activities much faster and more flexi-
bly. However, one of the major barriers to increased use of autonomy in
such scenarios is the lack of assurances that the autonomous behaviour
will work as expected. In this paper, we use a Robot Operating Sys-
tem (ROS) model of the Curiosity that is simulated in Gazebo and add
an autonomous agent that is responsible for high-level decision-making.
Then, we use a mixture of formal and non-formal techniques to verify
the distinct system components (ROS nodes). This use of heterogeneous
verification techniques is essential to provide guarantees about the nodes
at different abstraction levels, and allows us to bring together relevant
verification evidence to provide overall assurance.
1 Introduction
We present a case study with a simulation of the Curiosity rover undertaking
an exploration mission. Crucially, we have equipped the rover with decision-
making capabilities so that it does not rely on human teleoperation. As a result
of the added autonomous behaviour, it is important to provide safety assurances
about critical components in the system. Usually, components in such systems
are modular and each individual component often requires a different verification
technique(s) [13,9,6]. We have applied distinct verification techniques to various
critical components and at different abstraction levels to ensure the correctness
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Fig. 1: The Curiosity begins at the origin, o, and then visits the waypoints A, B and C in whichever
order is safe. We indicate waypoints with high levels of wind (grey) and radiation (yellow).
of the overall system. All of the artefacts (source code, videos, etc.) discussed in
this paper are available in our online repository1.
2 Mission Description, Simulation and Autonomy
Mission Description: We simulate an inspection mission, where the Curiosity
patrols a topological map of the surface of Mars. We assume that the map is
known prior to this mission, and in this paper we only consider a small subset
of the map (i.e. the agent has map coordinates for each waypoint in the map).
Specifically, we consider four different waypoints (o, A, B , and C ) that are
spread across the Martian terrain. Low-level movement is achieved through a
dead reckoning or feedback control.
We begin with the deployment of the Curiosity and a startup period where
it initialises all three of its control modules (wheels, arms, and mast). After
the agent receives confirmation that the modules are ready, it autonomously
controls the Curiosity to move between the waypoints in the following order:
(o → A → B → C → A → . . .), as shown in Fig. 1. This is the ideal scenario,
however, if one of the waypoints is experiencing high levels of radiation then
the rover should skip it until the radiation has reduced to a safe level. For data
collection, the mast and arm should be open, however, it is unsafe to do so in
windy conditions. We do not model battery power. Instead, we assume that the
rover has sufficient battery power to traverse the waypoints and operate the
equipment.
Simulation: We obtained a Robot Operating System (ROS) [10] version of the
Curiosity from a ROS teaching website2 which uses official data and 3D models
of the Curiosity and Martian terrain which have been made public by NASA.
This ROS simulation runs in Gazebo3, a 3D simulator. Most of the Curiosity’s
effectors are included in the simulation. It has the complete chassis of the rover
with all six wheels and the suspension system, a retractable arm with four joints,
and a retractable mast with two joints and a camera (Mastcam) on top. Some of
the sensors are missing, e.g. MAHLI (Mars Hand Lens Imager), as these would
require simulated sensor data.
1 https://github.com/autonomy-and-verification-uol/curiosity-NFM2020
2 https://bitbucket.org/theconstructcore/curiosity_mars_rover/src/master/
3 http://gazebosim.org/
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In the original configuration, the standard control method of the Curiosity
was implemented using ROS services and it was controlled via teleoperation.
ROS services are defined as a pair of request and reply messages that are provided
by ROS nodes. In our simulation, we re-implemented the control method through
action libraries, which follow a client-server model that is similar to ROS services.
Both can receive a request to perform some task and then generate a reply. The
difference in using action libraries is that the client can cancel the action, as well
as receive feedback about the task execution. Thus, action libraries are more
suited for use with decision-making agents since they allow more fine-grained
control.
We developed three action libraries: one each for the wheels, arm, and mast.
The wheels client receives high-level action commands to move forward, back-
ward, left, and right; or a waypoint from the topological map (using the move
base library for path planning). Based on the command received, the server con-
trols each of the six wheels and publishes speed commands to the appropriate
wheels depending on the direction or topological waypoint requested in the ac-
tion. If a direction command is given, then the server expects three parameters:
direction of movement, speed, and distance. After a movement action, the server
always calls a stop action that sets the speed of all wheels to zero. The arm and
mast action libraries control the joints of their respective effectors so that they
can be positioned correctly for use.
Enabling Autonomous Decision-Making: We use the GWENDOLEN [4] agent
programming language to implement the high-level control and autonomous
decision-making behaviour of the Curiosity. Agent programming languages ab-
stract the environment and other external sources, focusing on high-level au-
tonomous control, resulting in smaller and more modular code than other lan-
guages. Due to the agent’s reasoning cycle an execution trace can clearly show
how the agent came to a decision, thus providing us with explainability. Using
GWENDOLEN allows us to verify properties of the agent’s reasoning, allowing
the safeguard of critical behaviours.
GWENDOLEN agents follow the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model [11].
Beliefs, desires, and intentions represent respectively the information, motiva-
tional, and deliberative states of the agent. We developed a GWENDOLEN
environment that communicates with ROS through the rosbridge library. When
the agent executes an action in the environment, the action is processed and
published to the action’s associated ROS topic. The environment creates sub-
scribers that listen to specific topics so that necessary perceptions are created
and sent to the agent.
In the Curiosity simulation, the GWENDOLEN agent has four high-level
actions. The action control wheels has three parameters: direction of movement
(forward, backward, left, or right), speed (an integer with sign to indicate di-
rection), and distance (in seconds). The move to waypoint action contains one
parameter with a waypoint from the topological map. The actions, control arm
and control mast, both have one parameter whose possible values are either open
or close.
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Fig. 2: Overview of the system. Arrows indicate data flow between the nodes.
Fig. 2 illustrates a high-level system diagram with the communication paths
between the nodes in the simulation. We have verified distinct components of this
simulation using different methods. Specifically, we verify the autonomous agent
using the AJPF program model checker; the interface that this agent has with
the environment using Dafny; a CSP specification of the action library nodes
using FDR4; and we use each of these formal models to guide the generation
of runtime monitors. This combination of simulation-based testing, and the use
of multiple formal methods at different levels of abstraction, gives us a basis
for providing assurances about the use of autonomous decision-making in this
extreme environment mission scenario, and could be transferred and applied to
other similar case studies as shown in [13,6,9].
3 Verification
This section describes our verification of four critical areas of our simulation of
an autonomous Curiosity rover. We verify properties of this system at different
levels of abstraction. We begin by describing how we verify that the agent, which
is fundamentally controlling the system, makes the correct decisions about which
waypoint to visit next.
Next, we discuss our use of an automated theorem prover to verify that the
information that the agent receives from the environment sensors is interpreted
and acted upon correctly. Then, we outline how we verified that the communi-
cation between the client and server action library nodes (as shown in Fig. 2)
functions correctly. Finally, we outline our Runtime Verification (RV) of design-
time assumptions about the environment. Interestingly, we used the preceding
formal models as a way to focus these runtime checks on appropriate properties.
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Verifying the Agent using AJPF: Model-checking [2] exhaustively examines the
state space to check if some desired property holds. This can be applied to either
a formal model of the system, encoded in some specification language, or directly
to the implementation. The property to be verified is usually specified in a logic-
based language. For example, we may want to verify that the Curiosity will not
move its arm while collecting soil and rock data, in order to protect the sample.
Agent Java PathFinder (AJPF) [5], an extension of Java PathFinder (JPF) [12],
is a model-checker that works directly on Java program code. This extension fa-
cilitates formal verification of BDI-based agent programs by providing a property
specification language based on Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) that sup-
ports the description of terms usually found in BDI agents.
For example, some of the properties that we verified of the implementation
of our agent were as follows:
✷(Arovermove to waypoint(A) → ♦Brover (at(A)))
✷(Arovermove to waypoint(B) → ♦Brover (at(B)))
✷(Arovermove to waypoint(C ) → ♦Brover (at(C )))
These properties state that it is always the case (✷) that if the rover agent
executes the action move to waypoint (to either A, B, or C), then eventually
(♦) the rover agent will believe that it is currently located in that waypoint.
The syntax of the AJPF specification language is limited to expressing agent
related properties, such as beliefs, goals, actions, and intentions of a specific
agent that was written in GWENDOLEN. Moreover, properties specified in
AJPF must be ground (i.e. cannot be parameterised). For verifying the interface
between the agent and the environment, we employ the Dafny program verifier.
Verifying the Agent-Environment Interface: Dafny facilitates the use of spec-
ification constructs e.g. pre-/post-conditions, loop invariants and variants [8].
Dafny is used in the static verification of functional program correctness. Pro-
grams are translated into the Boogie intermediate verification language [1] and
then the Z3 automated theorem prover discharges the associated proof obliga-
tions [3].
Our Dafny model centres on the decisions made by the agent in response to
the input that it receives from the environment. In this simple model, we verify
an important safety property that the rover will not select any actions if the
arm, mast or wheels have not been initialised yet. This is specified as follows:
ensures (wheelsready && armready && mastready) == false ==> actions ==[];
Here, wheelsready, armready and mastready are boolean flags that are toggled
by the associated modules, and actions is the sequence of returned actions.
Our Dafny model has functions for accessing the environmental conditions
at a given waypoint e.g. getEnvironment() and getWind(). This allows us to
verify properties about the how the environmental conditions affect where the
rover goes. The getEnvironment()method then checks the wind and radiation
at a particular waypoint and we verify that the following condition is met where
e is a variable that represents the current status of the environment:
ensures windspeed < 5 && radiation < 5 ==> e == Fine;
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In this way, our Dafny model allows us to verify conditions about the safety of the
agent and also that the information coming from the environment is interpreted
correctly by the agent. We provide other verified methods including getRad()
which is a high-level implementation of how the radiation at waypoint B decays
over time. Our loop invariant in the CuriosityAgent() also ensures that the
rover can’t be at waypoint B when the radiation is too high:
invariant !(current == B && env == Radiation);
We included radiation at B in the Dafny implementation to examine how the
rover reacts to radiation at a particular waypoint, as per the mission description
(Sect. 2). Next, we verify the action library client and server nodes using CSP.
Verifying Action Library Communication: We verify the communication between
the pairs of action library client–server nodes that interface between the soft-
ware and hardware (arm, mast, and wheels). Each client accepts instructions
from the agent (via rosbridge) which it then sends to the relevant server node as
a goal (task to complete). Since the AJPF model checker can only check agent-
programs, we decided to use Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) to ver-
ify this critical link. CSP processes describe sequences of events; a → b → Skip
is the process where events a and b occur sequentially, then terminates (Skip).
The CSP model is constructed from the Curiosity ROS code, capturing both
the program-specific and the generic action library behaviour. Each of the client–
server pairs is modelled by one CSP file, with one further file modelling the
generic behaviour of an action library server. We use the FDR4 model-checker [7]
to check three properties: (1) when a client sends a goal, it will begin execution
on the correct server, (2) when a client sends a goal, eventually it receives a
result from the server, and (3) when the agent instructs a client node to perform
an action, the server informs the agent that it is ready and then eventually the
agent receives a result. Here we give an example of (2), where we check that if
the arm client sends a goal then eventually it will receive a result:
send goal arm? → executeGoal .arm → SKIP
Runtime Verification: It is achieved by examining the current execution of the
system at runtime against a formal specification. Since runtime monitors only
observe the current system execution, the resulting approach is not exhaustive in
the sense that model-checking is (which examines the entire state space). How-
ever, monitor implementations are usually extremely efficient since they do not
consider all possible system executions and they can remain as safeguards after
deployment. In this way, a monitor helps to ensure correct system behaviour.
ROSMonitoring4 (ROSMon) is a flexible and formalism-agnostic RV frame-
work for ROS. ROSMon creates gaps in the communication between nodes in
the system. These gaps are then filled by monitors which are automatically syn-
thesised by ROSMon. In this way, the messages of interest are forced to pass
through the monitors and are checked against a corresponding formal specifi-
cation. We applied ROSMon to our simulation to check properties at runtime.
4 https://github.com/autonomy-and-verification-uol/ROSMonitoring
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For example, using Dafny, we verify the agent-environment interface; ROSMon
bridges the gap between the Dafny model and the real environment by checking
at runtime if the assumptions used in the Dafny model are satisfied by the real
system.
We used a property, written in Runtime Monitoring Language (RML), to
synthesise a monitor to check the constraint used in the Dafny getEnvironment
method. Here, we check that the wind speed and radiation are always positive,
and if the wind speed and radiation are less than 5 each, then the environment
is “Fine”. This is (partially) written as follows:
Main = (GetEnvironmentConstraints /\ (wind_speed(_) >> wind_speed_at_least(0)*) /\
(radiation_units(_) >> radiation_units_at_least(0)*));
GetEnvironmentConstraints =
wind_speed_up_to(4) GetEnvironmentConstraints1
\/ radiation_units_up_to(4) GetEnvironmentConstraints2
\/ any GetEnvironmentConstraints;
...
In this way, we used abstract formal system models to guide the development
of corresponding runtime monitors to examine these properties at runtime.
4 Discussion
This paper has reported on our case study of using multiple verification tech-
niques to provide assurance for an autonomous Curiosity rover undertaking an
exploration/sampling mission. We used the GWENDOLEN agent program-
ming language to implement an autonomous agent in a ROS-based simulation
of the Curiosity. We verified this agent using AJPF, how it responds to discrete
input from its environment using Dafny, the message passing between the action
library nodes using CSP, and we synthesised runtime monitors using ROSMon.
We employed a myriad of verification techniques to verify the behaviour of
distinct aspect(s) of the system. Our aim was to streamline the process of veri-
fying the system by verifying each system component using a suitable technique,
rather than attempting to verify everything using only one technique. For exam-
ple, we use an agent programming language for the agent and CSP for message
passing. The tool used to verify the agent program is not appropriate (and would
generally not work) to verify message passing.
Our use of RV is of particular interest here since the system is implemented
in C++ or Python for which formal verification at code level is not currently
feasible/possible. However, the tools and techniques that were chosen are not
necessarily the only ones that were suitable for any specific component and
certainly other choices could have been made. Future work includes investigating
these alternatives.
Our use of heterogeneous techniques for various critical components of the
system was motivated by the work done in [13,6,9]. Our case study exhibits how
heterogeneous verification techniques can be applied to various components of an
autonomous robotic system at different levels of abstraction. Future work seeks
to link the results of these heterogeneous techniques in a holistic framework so
that they might inform one another.
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